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BOOK REVIEW
AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876.

By

Maxwell Bloomfield.1 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press. 1976. Pp. ix, 397. $15.00.
Reviewed by Alfred S. Konefsky 2
Law is first and foremost a social artifact, but what most
studies of law and history have emphasized is not the social content of law but its autonomy and internal symmetry. Unfortunately, this leaves out of the equation its two most important factors: the lawyer and his client. We have become famous in this
country for consistently writing about law without ever mentioning lawyers. For the most part, only judges who feed the doctrinal
machine have been deemed worthy of study. And so any book that
promises "to focus, as far as possible, upon the interaction between
law, lawyers, and American society" (p. viii) should be an especially welcome addition to the literature of antebellum legal history.3
Unfortunately, Maxwell Bloorfield's book does not live up to
its promise, for it suffers from serious problems of both structure
and substance. Instead of a unified interpretation, Bloomfield
gives us a series of vignettes, some of which focus more or less on
individual lawyers' careers, others of which concern broader
movements or problems during this period, and one of which
attempts to delineate a doctrinal area. Paradoxically, this approach causes him both to miss the common themes implicit in
his own essays, and to ignore the contradictions within the period.
Description is substituted for analysis, and potentially interesting

'Professor of American History, Catholic University.
2Editor, The Legal Papers of Daniel Webster, Dartmouth College; Charles
Warren Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard Law School.
3
For an exceptionally perceptive analysis of the general evolution of American
legal historiography, see Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common
Law Traditionin American Legal Historiography, io LAW & Soc. REv. 9 ('975).
On the general subject of historiography, perhaps it is time for those of us
who call ourselves legal historians to agree, for the immediate future, to a moratorium on writing about people who write about legal history, and to get on about
the process of writing legal history itself. For a discipline that is generally blessed
and excused by its infancy, American legal history has had an extraordinary number
of treatments of its short-lived historiographical tradition. Certainly by now we
have found a sufficient number of theories and models around which to construct
the historical materials themselves and I am convinced the future will obviously
call for its own stock-taking and reexamination. But that reexamination will also
be contingent on present and future production. Implicit in this is the assumption
and concession that Professor Gordon (has absolutely had the last word on the
subject- for now.
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issues are shunted aside. But even where an almost begrudgingly
offered analysis is attempted, it misses the mark. Clearly in the
consensus tradition, it tries vainly to camouflage the conflicts in
American history that the author's own essays unwittingly unearth. What we have for the most part is informative and often
interesting narrative history. What we do not have is legal history
that is meaningful social history.
Three of the book's biographical essays provide convenient
examples of the way in which Bloomfield has left potential unifying themes undeveloped.4 Two of them, "Peter Van Schaack and
The Problem of Allegiance" (pp. 1-31) and "William Pitt Ballinger, Confederate Lawyer" (pp. 271-301), could have been used
as the twin portraits with which to frame his book. Both men
anguished over decisions to abandon their countries. Van Schaack
was banished from New York in 1778 for his Tory views, or, more
precisely, for his refusal to be coerced into swearing allegiance
to the patriot cause. Returning after the Revolution, he reintegrated himself into American society, became an extreme partisan
of the Federalist cause, and vigorously supported, of course, the
coercive Alien and Sedition Acts. But perhaps he made his ultimate impact on succeeding generations through the law school he
established and taught in from 1786 to 1828. There he preached
to the sons of the Revolution, who had once banished him, the
ways of postponing the next round of change. His gospel was conservatism and security; he was a survivor, and he saw the opportunity to insure through the classroom that another upheaval did
not occur.
Like Van Schaack, Willam Pitt Ballinger struggled with the
problem of allegiance - whether to abandon his Whig Unionism
and as a prominent citizen of Galveston, Texas, to embrace the
Confederate ideology. At first, Ballinger pleaded the Union cause
(as a successful attorney he enjoyed extensive contact with
Northern business interests), but after Lincoln's election he painfully recognized the inevitability of the conflict, accepted the secessionist position, and became a Confederate receiver of alien
enemy property. After the war, he promptly journeyed to Washington and procured a pardon for himself and a number of friends.
He returned both to Galveston and the Union and prospered in his
' The best example of a collection of essays in American history written with a
unified view of all the subject matter embraced within it is still Richard Hofstadter's The American Political Tradition, published in 1948. See also Lasch, Foreword to id. (Vintage paperback ed. 1973) (describing the general social and historical forces that influenced Hofstadter at that moment in modern American
intellectual history).
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legal career. As Van Schaack before him, Ballinger had wrestled
with his conscience, maintained his original political beliefs as
long as possible (though the risks were clearly greater for Van
Schaack than Ballinger), and resumed his career after the imposed ordeal.
Bloomfield tells these tales very skillfully, but he neglects to
investigate any of the important questions which might yield unifying themes. Did the legal training of both men, or their internalization of the legal ideology of the period, make their original
choices difficult? Was there a link between their views of law
and their political beliefs? Many Tories, lawyers and nonlawyers,
fled the colonies; many Southerners agonized over their loyalty to
the Union. Were the experiences of nonlawyers similar or did
these two lawyers think about the dilemma differently? And did
their legal mentality or immersion in the law make the rationalization of their subsequent readjustments easier? Van Schaack,
after all, could have stayed in England. Or were they always
"Americans" or "Unionists" at heart? Or was it simply human
nature? Or was it, perhaps unfairly, the lawyer-like quality of
arguing either side of a cause, albeit different sides at differing
times, with equal facility?
Ironically, Bloomfield has placed between the Van Schaack
and Ballinger chapters (the first and next to last in his book), an
essay on "William Sampson and the Codification Movement" (pp.
59-9o) which might have been used to throw light on some of
these questions. Sampson was an exile himself, not from but to
the United States, having been deported from England in 1799
for his role in the Irish rebellion. Living first in Portugal and
then in France, he finally arrived in the United States in i8o6 on July 4 th. His social sympathies became evident in his law
practice as he represented, among others, "low-income groups"
(P. 73) and the Journeyman Cordwainers in an early labor conspiracy case. Coming from this milieu, Sampson perceived the
need for a deep and far-reaching reform of the legal system. It
took the form of codification in the I820s.

But Bloomfield seems to view Sampson's demand for codification more as an intellectual exercise than as a product of social
forces. Sampson, he tells us, "rejected" the "element of class antagonism" in embracing the codification movement. Rather he
"worked for reform within the.legal profession, looking to the
scholar rather than the demagogue to carry through [his] program" (p. 77, emphasis in original). It is true that Sampson directed many of his arguments to the profession. He clearly understood the importance of trying to convince his brethren that his
notions were not an impractical scheme designed to eliminate the
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need for lawyers. But I think Bloomfield has overlooked in Sampson's rhetoric the underlying social passion. Sampson believed
that the common law was not delivering social justice to a large
class of litigants, many of them his own clients (and many of them
the same people Bloomfield himself sees being victimized by the
poor law in his chapter on "The Family in Antebellum Law" (pp.
91-135)), and that codification would distribute justice more
equally. It took an outsider like Sampson to appreciate that a
problem existed. Perhaps this is the deeper meaning, missed by
Bloomfield, which explains why Van Schaack and Ballinger, more
insiders than outsiders, readjusted so readily to the status quo
after their different types of exile; and why Sampson felt so uncomfortable arriving and functioning as an exile.
Other essays provide further examples of Bloomfield's failure
to pause to arrange the themes and see the cross-currents, paradoxes, and ironies that have formed the history of the legal profession. For example, he places an essay on "Riot Control in
Philadelphia" (pp. 191-234) before one on "Frederick Grimk6
and the Dynamics of Social Change" (pp. 235-270). Stripped of
its intellectual trappings, the theory of the genteel Grimk6's Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions I was that a certain limited
amount of social mobility will forestall social change. Yet the
"Riot Control" essay, without even mentioning an apostle of social
stability like Grimk6, shows the social fabric of urban America
being torn asunder in 1844 as lower class nativist Protestants
took out their wrath on lower class immigrant Catholics. The
essays stand independently, but they do not fit together, as much
of American history does not fit when the consensus garb is
stripped away.
A still greater problem of historical discontinuity, again
missed by Bloomfield, arises when the chapters on "Antilawyer
Sentiment in the Early Republic" (pp. 32-58) and on "Upgrading
the Professional Image" (pp. 136-i 9o) are contrasted. The problem can best be posed by reproducing two quotations, one from
each chapter.
i) But the vehemence of popular protest against the bar should
not obscure its essentially conservative character. Campaigns to
"get the lawyers" represented no Marxist struggles between opposing economic groups, no risings of the propertyless masses
against an oppressive capitalist order. Most of the malcontents
were sturdy middle-class types who were bent upon protecting
their property rights against what they conceived to be a new
form of tyranny. (P. 44.)
5

F. GRuIK,
TUTIONS (x848).

CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTI-
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2) But behind a facade of objectivity and non-committal exposition law writers busily pursued a further end: the creation of an
effective counterimage to the popular stereotypes of the lawyer as
an enemy of the lower classes. (P. 144.)

If we accept Bloomfield's description and conclusions, what
happened between the immediate post-Revolutionary period and
the 183os and 184os? Why did legal writers eventually understand
that their ultimate vulnerability came from the charge that they

were oppressing the "lower classes" and not merely that the middle
class was unsatisfied with the efficiency or cost of the legal services
that it could afford? 6 Do we find the beginning of our more modern debate over the delivery and discriminatory nature of legal
services buried within the legal periodicals of the antebellum
period? 7 Surely someone was complaining if lawyers discerned a

need to react. Are not these the problems that engaged the interests of the codifiers as well? The two separate essays are not
necessarily contradictory, but they are opposed to each other, and
seemingly unaware of the different ways they lead us. Perhaps a
crucial insight into the period is involved, but if it is, we are entitled to be told how we got from A to B. The book is full of
historical events, but lacks insight into change.

It would be unfair to say that Bloomfield totally eschews analysis. His concluding chapter (pp. 34o-48) is clearly an attempt

in that direction. But it is a flawed one. Part of Bloomfield's
problem is the imprecision with which he applies the categories
and terminology of modern sociological analyses of American
' Oddly enough, just a few short pages before the first quotation printed above

ascribing post-Revolutionary anti-lawyer sentiment to "middle-class types," Bloomfield quotes the following instructions in 1786 from the inhabitants of New Braintree, Massachusetts to its representative in the General Court:
With regard to the Practitioners of the Law in this Commonwealth, daily
experience convinces us of the horrid extortion, tyranny and oppression, practised among that order of men, who, of late years, have amazingly increased
in number, opulence, and grandeur ...

and we think there is much to fear

from so powerful and numerous a body of men as the practitioners of the
law are now become, if they are suffered still to proceed on, without any
check or controul. (P. 42.)
I have not examined the demographic make-up of the signers of the New Braintree
document, and so I am leery in this modern age of quantification about drawing any
conclusions about who they were. But if impressionistic evidence is worth anything anymore, it does not necessarily sound like they were voicing "middle-class"
complaints. An interpretation stressing either "lower class" complaints or the
rhetoric of the American Revolution might be as consistent with the quoted excerpt.
7 For an important treatment of this and similar problems in a more recent
setting, see J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE iN
MODERN A mEcA (1975).
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society to an earlier phase of American life. A brief survey or
catalogue of the undigested categories culled from that final chapter includes: "below the poverty line," "non-poor white Americans," "the industrious poor," "dependent status," "middle-class
comfort" (p. 342); "sectors from every social stratum," "members of the middle and upper classes" (p. 343); "low-income
Americans," "lower-class clients," "the poor," "the existing power
structure" (p. 344); "lower-income clients," "a conservative
elite" (p. 348). The most troubling aspect of this listing is that
Bloomfield is unable to infuse these categories with substantive
meaning. There are no measuring devices inherent in the categories. Are we equating class with income levels? Are "lowerclass clients" the same as "lower-income clients"? Is Bloomfield
intimating that he perceives a developed class consciousness or is
he thinking simply along the lines of some unmeasured notion
of income? Where do race, religion, and ethnicity fit? Into
classes? Or into income levels? The image is overwhelmingly
blurred.
The problem really is that although American historiography
has not yet had its E.P. Thompson, Bloomfield writes as if it
had.' All the historical questions about the formation and growth
of social classes I in this country are put aside in favor of convenient, shorthand expressions. Moreover, they are expressions
that are designed to make us accept without thinking his underlying, barely articulated major premise: that law, lawyers, and
legal theorists in the century after the Revolution helped maintain
class fluidity - and thus made more plausible that element of the
bar's rationalization of the legal professionalization process. The
risk is that once again we have misread rhetoric for reality, and
that the reverse may be true -that the legal system in general,
with the aid of lawyers, helped freeze the system along class
lines. In any event, neither thesis, as far as I know, has been the
object of historical inquiry. Merely asserting one theory, even
in an unintended way, is not helpful.

One final aspect of American Lawyers is disappointing
8

-

It may turn out that American history is not susceptible to the same type of

analysis offered by Thompson in his monumental The Making of the English
Working Class, published in 1963. Regardless of the conclusions reached, the concepts developed by Thompson for England have been employed only occasionally by
American historians as they have investigated the history of the American labor
movement or the history of the American working class.
I Given the limited space available, I have adopted Bloomfield's categories for
purposes of discussion and illustration.
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Bloomfield seems determined to separate law from lawyers rather
than to join them. There is no indication that part of the antilawyer sentiment in various periods might be related to the type
and structure of the law that the lawyers administered. The focus
is on their role, somewhat removed from the real world, instead
of on what they were implementing. The two ought to be linked.
By not linking them, Bloomfield succumbs to the seductive ideology of the law's autonomy despite his stated intention not to do so.
The connection can be made. The chapter on Sampson would
seem to provide at least one ideal opportunity -for
Sampson's
reformist energies were directly aimed at the substance of the law.
And Bloomfield himself catalogues the unjust nature of a number of aspects of poor law and family law. Yet he does not go the
next step of joining the results that issued from that scheme of law
and the lawyer's techniques in enforcing it. Surely any effective
study of the law and social history must seek to explain satisfactorily the relationship between the rule of law and the role of
lawyers.

